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COMMENTARY AND DIALOGUE

Explaining the “Inexplicable”: A Response to
Powers of Attorney under the Uniform Power of
Attorney Act Including Reference to Virginia
Law by F. Philip Manns, Jr.
ANDREW H. HOOK*
JESSICA A. HAYES**
In his article “Powers of Attorney under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act Including Reference to Virginia Law,” F. Philip Manns, Jr.
notes that Virginia’s adoption of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act
(“UPOAA”) included approximately two dozen changes to the uniform
text.1 “Some of those changes,” he says, “are inexplicable; others are
misguided.”2
One of the authors of this commentary, Andrew H. Hook, had the
honor of serving as Chair of the Drafting Committee of the Virginia Bar
Association’s Wills, Trusts, and Estates Section (“Drafting Committee”), which was tasked with studying the UPOAA and making recommendations relating to its adoption in Virginia.3 Recognizing the value
of uniformity among state laws, it was the Drafting Committee’s goal to
stay as true to the UPOAA as possible, avoiding any radical changes
* Mr. Hook is the President of the Hook Law Center, P. C. He is a Fellow of the
American College of Trust & Estate Counsel and a Fellow of the National Academy of
Elder Law Attorneys. He is a co-author of Representing the Elderly or Disabled Client
and the Special Needs Handbook and author of the BNA Portfolio on Durable Powers of
Attorney. Mr. Hook is the Chair of the Elder Law Section of the Virginia Bar Association and a member of the Virginia Bar Association Trust & Estates Committee. He is a
former President of the Special Needs Alliance and a former member of the Board of
Directors of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys. Mr. Hook is a Certified
Elder Law Attorney (“CELA”), Certified Financial Planner (“CFP®”), and an Accredited Estate Planner (“AEP®”).
** Jessica A. Hayes is an attorney at Pender & Coward, P.C. in Virginia Beach,
Virginia. A graduate of the College and William and Mary and Regent University School
of Law, she is a member of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys and the
Virginia State Bar Trusts and Estates Section, and is licensed to practice law in both
Virginia and North Carolina.
1 F. Philip Manns, Jr., Powers of Attorney under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act
Including Reference to Virginia Law, 43 ACTEC L.J. 151, 152 (2018).
2 Id. at 152.
3 See J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 403, 403-04
(2010).

417

418

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:417

while incorporating minor changes where Virginia’s common law differed in meaningful ways.
The space allotted prohibits the authors from addressing all of the
issues Mr. Manns has raised; however, based on Mr. Hook’s experiences
while serving on the Drafting Committee, the authors wish to address
two issues raised by Mr. Manns – the ostensible “overlap” between the
hot powers of gifting and trust creation, and the tension between the
protection of the principal and of third parties.
I. HOT POWER OVERLAP
Two of the “hot powers” which must be expressly granted in a
power of attorney in order for them to apply under the Virginia
UPOAA are the authority to make a gift and the authority to create a
trust.4 This is true under the UPOAA, as well.5 Because a gift may be
made outright or in trust,6 Mr. Manns concludes that the authority to
create the trust to which the gift is made is implicit in the gifting hot
power, and therefore, these hot powers overlap.7
The intent in the creation of these two separate and distinct hot
powers is just that – for these powers to be separate and distinct. Because one hot power requires that the authority to create a trust must be
expressly granted,8 this authority cannot simply be implied from the gifting hot power. Further, in making its recommendations, the Drafting
Committee intentionally tied the trust creation hot power to Virginia’s
Uniform Trust Code, which provides that one manner in which a trust
may be created is by an agent under a power of attorney which specifically grants the authority to do so.9 The Drafting Committee was careful
to ensure these provisions were consistent.
Mr. Manns also examines whether the power to make a gift includes the power to create a right of survivorship, which is another hot
power under the Virginia UPOAA.10 Interestingly, he concludes, “It appears not, because the two are separate hot powers, and each must be
separately granted by reference to a distinct descriptive term.”11 The
authors agree, and suggest the application of this logic to the question of
whether gifting authority inherently includes the authority to create a
trust.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1622(A)(1)-(2) (2017).
UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 201(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2016).
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1638(B)(1).
Manns, supra note 1, at 178-79.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1622(A)(1).
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-719(A)(1).
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1622(A)(3).
Manns, supra note 1, at 179.
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Based on his article, it appears Mr. Manns simultaneously believes
that the Virginia UPOAA has failed to adequately protect the principal,
making it too easy for third parties to avoid accepting powers of attorney,12 and that it has omitted the third party protection offered by the
UPOAA.13 This is not only untrue, but impossible.
The Drafting Committee which made the legislative recommendations leading to the adoption of the UPOAA in Virginia was composed
of trusts and estates attorneys representing both individuals and banks.
The resulting Virginia UPOAA is the product of negotiations between
these parties and the Virginia Bankers Association, all of which recognized and had a desire to combat the rising number of financial elder
abuse cases. Attorneys for the banks wished to put into place mechanisms which would give the banks confidence in their acceptance of
powers of attorney. Attorneys representing mostly individuals lobbied
for the maximum protection of the consumer.
Virginia’s resolution of these competing interests is a delicate balancing act between protecting the principal and giving him the benefit of
knowing his power of attorney is more likely to be accepted. In analyzing this issue, it is important that we not confuse “protecting the third
party too much” with encouraging third parties to accept the power of
attorney.
While ideally the risk of loss would always be shifted to the agent
who acts in bad faith, in practice, by the time the law catches up with
that agent, he frequently has no assets with which to make restitution or
pay a judgment. The Virginia UPOAA, in conformity with the UPOAA,
shifts the risk of loss to the principal in more cases than not, to increase
the likelihood of acceptance of a power of attorney by a third party.
Three provisions within the Virginia UPOAA which Mr. Manns
cites as evidence that it provides too much protection to third parties are
(1) the ability of the third party to preemptively insert boilerplate into
their contracts by which the principal relieves the third party from an
obligation to engage in a transaction with his or her agent;14 (2) the
ability of the third party to request an opinion of counsel – from counsel
for the principal, the agent, or even the third party – before acceptance
12

Id. at 175-76.
“The power of attorney in Virginia also will be a decidedly less effective alternative to a Virginia revocable living trust,” he says, “for what the VaUPOAA takes away
from the UPOAA—third party protection—the Virginia Uniform Trust Code (VaUTC)
grants to Virginia trusts.” Id. at 193.
14 Id. at 185-86.
13
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of the power of attorney;15 and (3) the provisions which shift the risk of
the use of an invalid acknowledged power of attorney to the principal.16
The intent in giving third parties the option of including in their
contracts language whereby the principal agrees that the third party
shall not be required to engage in a transaction with his or her agent was
admittedly to give third parties a choice as to with whom they would do
business. Just as an attorney is not required to take any client who contacts them, the committee which recommended this provision reasoned
that a bank, for example, is not required to open an account for anyone
who walks through the door, nor should it be required to transact with
an agent with whom it does not have a relationship. This, of course, does
not preclude the bank from agreeing to nonetheless engage in the transaction with the agent.
The second and third provisions Mr. Manns discusses, however,
were included in the Virginia UPOAA in an effort to make it easier for
the consumer to use a power of attorney, and not for the purpose of
protecting the third party. If third parties were asked to rely on the
statements of the agent without being given the ability to request a legal
opinion, we would see fewer third parties willing to accept a power of
attorney about which they have a question or concern. If third parties
were permitted to request an opinion of counsel only from the principal
or agent’s attorney, the third party would still be less likely to accept the
power of attorney simply because the opinion did not come from their
own trusted legal advisor. In practice, a third party will generally only
request an opinion of counsel when it has a real concern about the
power of attorney, and giving it the ability to obtain counsel from its
own trusted attorney should result in either the alleviation or the validation of that concern. Likewise, the provisions which shift to the principal
the risk of the use of an invalid acknowledged power of attorney exist to
make a third party more comfortable in accepting a power of attorney
when it does not know whether the agent’s authority is void, invalid, or
terminated, or that the agent is exceeding or improperly exercising his
authority.17 If third parties bore this burden, they would rarely be willing to permit an agent to act.
Virginia’s UPOAA was designed not to “demolish” the consumer
protections of the UPOAA, as Mr. Manns asserts,18 but to balance the
competing interests of consumer protection and the ease with which a
principal’s power of attorney may be accepted. To encourage the acceptance of powers of attorney, much of the risk was shifted to the principal.
15
16
17
18

Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 189.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1617(B) (2017).
Manns, supra note 1, at 192.
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In seeking to promote the acceptance of powers of attorney, however,
the Drafting Committee recognized that a line should be drawn, a point
at which the risk was shifted to third parties. It chose forgery as that
line, providing clearly that a third party may not rely upon as valid an
acknowledged power of attorney which contains a forged signature of
the principal.19 This determination was made in an effort to protect the
principal who has no idea of the existence of a power of attorney.
Despite the clear language of section 64.2-1617(B) of the Code of
Virginia,20 Mr. Manns expresses some uncertainty as to whether the
third party may nonetheless avoid liability for accepting a power of attorney with a forged signature by requesting a certification from the
agent.21 Based on his interpretation of section 64.2-1617(C) of the Code
of Virginia, Mr. Manns determines that “a third party in Virginia asked
to accept an ‘acknowledged power of attorney’ may request, and rely
upon, without further investigation, an agent’s certification that the
principal’s signature is genuine, even if that acknowledged power of attorney contains a forged signature of the principal.”22 He continues:
“[A]nd if so, the VaUPOAA’s demolishing of the consumer protections
of the UPOAA is all-encompassing.”23 And finally, he concludes: “The
VaUPOAA . . . allows a well-advised third party to pin the consumer in
the worst place: unable to seek sanctions for unreasonable refusals to
accept, yet bearing the risk of a forged signature of the principal.”24
Fortunately for the principal in Virginia, this interpretation is incorrect;
when the signature of the principal has been forged, it is the third party
which bears the liability for its acceptance, regardless of whether the
agent has provided a certification.
Despite his conclusion that the Virginia UPOAA protects third parties too much, in the next section, Mr. Manns predicts that “The power
of attorney in Virginia will be a decidedly less effective alternative to a
Virginia revocable living trust, for what the VaUPOAA takes away from
the UPOAA—third party protection—the Virginia Uniform Trust Code
. . . grants to Virginia trusts.”25 It is difficult to fathom how it is possible
for Virginia’s UPOAA to simultaneously “demolish consumer protections” while taking away the third party protection of the UPOAA.
19

VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-1617(B).
“The preceding sentence shall not apply to an acknowledged power of attorney
that contains a forged signature of the principal.” Id.
21 Manns, supra note 1, at 192.
22 Id. at 192-93.
23 Id. at 192.
24 Id. at 193.
25 Id.
20
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While there can be no perfect solution from the perspectives of
both the principal and the third party, Virginia’s UPOAA represents a
fair and reasonable compromise between the two.

